China"s accelerated economic growth through the 1980s and into the 1990s led to some growth in trade and investment flows with South East Asia, but these were minor compared with the growth in South East Asia"s trade and investment flows with Japan, Korea and Taiwan, the USA and Western Europe. In addition, trade and investment flows within South East Asia grew after 1980. In 1990, when ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) membership still only comprised six nations, per capita GDP in all six was higher than in China (Table 1) . By the mid-1990s, four of these six countries had achieved over three decades of sustained economic growth, and were selected for inclusion in the World Bank"s 1993 "Asian Miracle" report (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia). The World Bank, and many other observers, argued that these countries had "got their policies right" and should be taken as models by less successful economies in other parts of the developing world. The 1993 report, written in the aftermath of the violence in Tiananmen Square, did not include China as one of the Asian miracles, although there was some discussion of the "growth spillover" from Hong Kong into southern China.
Even in the latter part of 1996, when influential commentators were already pointing to signs of trouble in some of the miracle economies, especially in Thailand, few expected that the economies in South East Asia would be in any way "threatened" by China. The financial crisis which hit much of the region in the latter part of 1997 and the ensuing capital outflow triggered a growth collapse in 1998 in several countries, and a slow economic recovery, especially in Thailand and Indonesia. In 2001, there was a further growth slowdown, especially in Malaysia and Singapore, as a result of falling world demand for electronics exports. By contrast, the Chinese economy was, or appeared to be, booming. By the early 2000s, a number of studies were emerging which suggested that China"s membership of the WTO would pose a considerable threat to other exporters, both in Asia and in other parts of the world. In the Asian context, there were several strands to this argument but the main two were that Chinese exports of labour-intensive manufactures (textiles, garments, footwear, toys, lowend electronics) would out-compete those of other Asian economies in the major OECD markets. In addition, as a result of its abundant supplies of cheap labour, huge investments in infrastructure and improvements in the legal and regulatory environment, foreign investment would flood into China at the expense of other parts of developing Asia. As per capita GDP in China grew, and a large middle class emerged, it was argued that more foreign investment would be oriented to the domestic market rather than to export production. But in either case, investment flows to the ASEAN countries would be affected.
By the early years of the 21 st century, there seemed to be plenty of evidence to support these fears. Let us examine the evidence on investment first. The share of the main South East Asian economies in total capital inflows into ASEAN plus China and Hong Kong contracted sharply after 1998, and had not recovered by 2004 (Ravenhill 2006: 656) . Net foreign investment flows in several ASEAN economies, particularly Indonesia, fell in absolute terms after 1997 and recovery was erratic. After 2002, inflows of foreign direct investment into the ASEAN economies did begin to grow again, especially in Singapore and Thailand (Athukorala and Wagle 2011: Figure 4) . But with the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, there were fall in ASEAN as a whole (Table   2) . Furthermore, several ASEAN countries had, by the early 21 st century had begun to export capital to other parts of the global economy. UNCTAD data showed that in 2007, capital outflows from ASEAN were around fifty billion dollars, although they fell in 2009-9 (Table 2) .
On the commodity trade side, a number of studies using computable general equilibrium models or other quantitative techniques showed that China would continue to take market share in a number of labourintensive products from other developing countries, including those in ASEAN (Tongzon 2005: 194) .
Unsurprisingly, Tongzon found that the product categories where Chinese competition would be most fierce were textiles and garments, footwear and some electrical products. In common with other analysts, Tongzon pointed out that the main source of China"s competitive advantage were low unit labour costs; he also stressed that China"s large and rapidly growing domestic market allowed firms to achieve economies of scale which further lowered costs, compared with other developing countries. Another study showed that the ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines) all experienced drops in manufactured exports relative to the pre-crisis trends (Woo 2006: 79) . Certainly the rapidly growing China market presented opportunities for exports from ASEAN into China But Tongzon (2005: 209) also pointed out that, even after its entry into the WTO, there remained a range of non-tariff barriers in China including inefficient customs administration and weak enforcement of rules and regulations governing imports at the regional level.
Given the considerable diversity within ASEAN by the early 21 st century, it was hardly surprising that different countries viewed the "threats and opportunities" offered by China"s growing trading might in different ways. In Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, where per capita GDP is higher than China, and where the manufacturing sectors are more linked in to the "Factory Asia" production networks, China"s rise has created greater trading opportunities. In the Malaysian case a recent study has found that FDI inflows have been positively correlated with those into China which suggest that complementarity rather than competition in FDIled industrial development between the two countries (Athukorala and Wagle 2011: 126 
The Indonesian Growth Slow-down and Recovery: Causes and Consequences
When world oil prices began to fall in Indonesia in the early 1980s, the Suharto government embarked on a series of reform measures which were designed to make the non-oil export sector more competitive, including two large devaluations, a duty drawback scheme for exporters, and measures to make ports more efficient. By the early 1990s these reforms seemed to have been very successful; the manufacturing sector grew rapidly, and exports of textiles, garments, footwear and wood products all increased. But the growth collapse which followed the Asian crisis in 1997/98 was extremely severe in Indonesia, and recovery was slow. Per capita GDP only regained its 1997 level in 2004. The cost of recapitalizing a devastated banking sector was enormous, and most of the burden fell on the government budget. This meant much needed government investment in education and infrastructure had to be drastically cut back. Government infrastructure investment had already slowed in the final years of the Suharto regime, when powerful private firms, often controlled by the presidential extended family and their cronies were given lucrative contracts to build infrastructure. Projects were often finished late and at high cost; in some cases they were never completed..
After the crisis, manufacturing growth slowed, and through to 2006 it was about the same as total GDP growth, although there was considerable variation across industrial sectors in growth of both output and exports (Aswicahyono, Narjoko and Hill 2008: 31) . It became clear after 1998 that at least part of the growth in This perception was reinforced by the rise in violent conflicts in several parts of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Eastern Indonesia, and the emergence of Islamic terrorist groups with international links whose bombing campaigns caused tragic loss of life in Bali and Jakarta. President Megawati was thought to be relying more heavily on the military to maintain order, often by repressive means. She also sought support from organized labour by introducing laws which increased minimum wages and made it more difficult and expensive for firms to dismiss workers. These policies further deterred foreign investors, who pointed out that labour costs were higher in Indonesia than in China, Vietnam, and Cambodia. The higher costs were not compensated by higher productivity; the educational and skill level of much of the labour force remained low.
By 2004 when the first direct presidential elections were held, all these problems were being extensively analysed in the Indonesian, the regional and the international press, as well as in academic studies and reports by international agencies. It was argued that Indonesia, in contrast to Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, was "not participating vigorously" in the new regional production networks which were evolving Table 7 ).
The blame was placed on poor logistics and cumbersome customs procedures, as well as inadequate investment in education and skills training. Some Indonesian commentators were blunter, and pointed out that corruption has become worse than under Suharto. On a range of economic, social and governance indicators it appears that Indonesia has been falling behind not just China but also economies such as Vietnam and India which in the early 1990s had been well behind Indonesia.
Few observers of Indonesian economic performance in the early years of the 21 st century placed the blame for Indonesia"s slow recovery from the Asian crisis on external threats, whether from China or elsewhere.
It seemed obvious that the key problems were internal, and included political instability, rising terrorism, deteriorating infrastructure, and stricter labour legislation all of which had caused a slowdown in FDI inflows into Indonesia. This slowdown would have occurred anyway, regardless of developments in China. While most analysts agreed that Chinese exports of textiles, garments and footwear were displacing those from both Indonesia and the Philippines in OECD markets, the solution seemed clear; these countries would either have to implement reforms to make their labour-intensive manufactures more competitive in world markets, or they would have to develop new export industries, taking advantage of growing demand in both China and other parts of the world for resource-based products.
In fact the years from 2004 to 2010 have seen considerable improvement in Indonesia"s export performance. Between 2003 and 2010, Indonesian exports more than doubled in terms of nominal dollars (Table   3 ). Part of this increase was due to price increases for important exports such as oil and gas and vegetable oils, but part was also the result of quantity increases. Only 20 per cent of the increase in export value between 2003 and 2010 came from oil and gas, and another 23 per cent from other mining products, including coal. Much of the rest of the growth came from manufactures including processed vegetable oils. Over these seven years, Indonesian exports to China grew more rapidly than total exports, and accounted for around twelve per cent of the total growth in dollar terms. By 2009, coal was the most important single export, followed by palm oil, gas, crude petroleum, and crumb rubber. Together these five products accounted for around 58 per cent of total exports to China in value terms in 2009 (Table 4 ).
In common with other ASEAN countries, Indonesia exports fell in dollar terms in 2009, as the full effects of the global downturn were felt both on prices and on demand, but there was a strong recovery in 2010.
Indonesian exports to China were only slightly lower in dollar terms in 2009 than in 2008, and there was some growth in 2010 (Table 3) . By 2009, China had become Indonesia"s second largest export market after Japan, and had overtaken Singapore. On the import side, growth between 2003 and 2010 was also very rapid, with only a slight decline in value terms in 2009 (Table 5) . By 2010, Chinese imports to Indonesia in dollar terms had overtaken those from both Singapore and Japan. They far outstripped imports from both the EU and the NAFTA countries. The balance of trade between Indonesia and China, which had been running in Indonesia"s favour in the earlier part of the decade had turned in China"s favour after 2008.
What was Indonesia importing from China? In 2009, around half of Chinese imports were in the machinery and transport equipment category; the second largest category was other manufactures, followed by chemicals (Table 6 ). In these three categories, China was running a large trade surplus with Indonesia. Imports of machinery were dominated by power generating and telecommunications equipment. It is probable that
Chinese imports in these types of machinery were associated with the investments made by Chinese firms in the power and gas sectors. Some machinery imports might also have displaced imports from more advanced countries such as Japan or Germany. In this sense, they can be seen as a net gain to Indonesia, rather than displacing local production. that ACFTA presented an opportunity for the ASEAN countries to "latch on to China"s production networks" and sell to Chinese consumers. The reaction in ASEAN was more muted, although the ASEAN SecretaryGeneral stated that the free trade area "will benefit both sides and help lift the world economy out of the crisis".
In one sense the official enthusiasm around a free trade area between China and the ASEAN-6 might seem rather odd, given that all these countries were already WTO members, and as such supposedly committed to non-discriminatory free trade. Most of the supporters of the ACFTA have made little attempt to spell out exactly what the benefits would be, either to China or to the various ASEAN countries. Indeed some commentators have suggested that the business communities in ASEAN and China played little role in creating the ACFTA, which appeared to be largely driven by political factors (Ravenhill 2010) . At the same time, voices were raised in the ASEAN region which were much less supportive of the ACFTA. In the Philippines, fears were expressed that it would simply legalise the widespread smuggling of footwear, garments, shoes, and other manufactures and agricultural products which has already placed considerable pressure on domestic producers.
The Indonesian government, no doubt concerned about the domestic implications of the ACFTA, formally lodged a letter on January 14, 2010, asking the ten ASEAN nations to defer the implementation until January 2011, although this did not happen.
Part of the concern in both Indonesia and the Philippines resulted from a fear that there might be a repeat of the Thai experience, when the so-called "early harvest" experiment during the Thaksin government caused problems for Thai farmers. In Thailand, tariffs on around two hundred fruits and vegetables between Thailand and China were removed. This resulted in a flood of products from China into Thailand, but Thai farmers found that exports of their products into China were still being subject to various tariff and non-tariff barriers. As tariffs are reduced or removed on a much broader range of agricultural and manufactured products, there is an expectation in several ASEAN countries that China will continue with what the outspoken Chinese economist, Hu Angang has termed China"s "half-open" model. This means that China will flood the ASEAN countries with Chinese products sold at extremely low prices, while taking in return only those products, mainly unprocessed raw materials, which are needed for China"s accelerated industrialization. The fact that many
Chinese producers had by early 2010 large unsold stocks of manufactures as a result of slowing world demand added to the concerns in ASEAN that these products will be dumped in Southeast Asia at below cost prices.
While it is easy to dismiss some of these claims as attempts by high-cost local producers to claim protection against cheaper imports, whether from China or elsewhere, the problem of dumping cannot be dismissed out of hand. The ACFTA agreement did not appear to include any formal procedures for settling disputes; in the longer term these will have to be introduced.
Indonesian fears were expressed in an opinion piece in Indonesia"s leading English-language paper, published in October 2010, which pointed out that "most people are of the opinion that Indonesia"s agricultural products and manufacturing goods are extremely uncompetitive against China"s". It went on to argue that instead of seeing the China-ASEAN free trade agreement as an instrument to strengthen the interdependence of the ASEAN region with China, many Indonesians see it as leading to "cutthroat competition that will have negative impacts on the development of Indonesian economic capabilities in the long term". Others view
Chinese policies as essentially neo-colonial; in its hunger for raw materials, China is in effect seeking to reimpose colonial patters of trade on Southeast Asia. It is too early to tell if these fears are justified or not, but they appear to reflect widely held beliefs in Indonesian business, media and political circles.
China, ASEAN and the East Asia 15
The last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed the peaceful and successful integration of China into the East Asian and the wider global economy. This process, largely market driven, is continuing into the 21st century, and has brought benefits to many tens of millions of Asians in terms of greater employment opportunities, and to even greater numbers in other parts of the world in terms of cheap consumer goods.
Inevitably there have been repercussions for producers of traded goods in other parts of Asia, and in other parts of the world. But the rise of China, and the robust growth in the global economy as a whole until 2008, presented the ASEAN economies with a number of opportunities to integrate themselves into global production networks. These opportunities have led to the rapid growth of plants, many Japanese-owned, producing vehicles and vehicle parts, and computer components in Thailand. In the Philippines, exports of electronic products increased rapidly, mainly as a result of investment by Japanese and American multinationals (Haltmeir et al.2007: 32-35 ).
The evidence certainly does not support the argument that the rise of China is wiping out the industrial sectors of all the ASEAN economies. Several of them have benefited from the growth of "Factory Asia", where "billions of different parts and components from plants spread across a dozen nations" are assembled and dispatched to markets all over the world (Baldwin 2006) . According to one recent study, trade in parts and components has been expanding more rapidly than final goods trade in recent years, and this trend has been has been "proportionately larger in East Asia, in particular in ASEAN, compared to North America and Europe" (Athukorala 2008: 505) . This author has also argued that the argument that China"s rise would "crowd out"
labour-intensive exports from other parts of Asia is not backed up by the evidence. To the extent that exports of textiles, footwear, garments etc have been falling in recent years, it has happened in the high-wage Asian economies as a result of their own changing comparative advantage (Athukorala 2009: 260) . Even in Indonesia, where some of the traditional labour-intensive industries have faced difficulties since 1998 for the reasons already discussed, garment, footwear and electronics exports have shown some increase in dollar terms, at least until 2008. In that year garment and footwear exports were valued at almost eight billion dollars, while exports of electrical and audio-visual equipment amounted to over eight billion dollars (Central Board of Statistics 2009:
515-21).
In contrast to some of its ASEAN partners, especially Singapore, Indonesia has not been enthusiastic in forming bilateral "free trade" arrangements with other countries, either in Asia or elsewhere. Its trade share with other ASEAN countries has risen since the 1990s, and by 2005 it was estimated that around 23 per cent of Indonesia"s total trade was with other ASEAN countries, especially Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. Around 62 per cent was with the "East Asian 15" which includes ASEAN, China, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong. Already in 1990, Indonesia was doing 58 per cent of its trade with these countries, which was much higher than the average for all 15 in that year. Although the intra-regional trade share increased between 1990
and 2005 for the East Asian-15, Indonesia continued to have a higher than average share (Table 7) . In this sense it could be argued that Indonesia has been more deeply integrated into the greater East Asian trade network over process of market-driven integration which has taken place since 1980 (Chia 2007; Baldwin 2006; Baldwin 2008) . Although Chia (2007: 30-31) argued that Baldwin"s pessimism about the fragility of East Asian regionalism is somewhat misplaced, both she and Baldwin appeared to support an ASEAN plus 3 FTA. This would present the best opportunity for the region as a whole, although the ASEAN countries are still faced with the twin challenges of completing their own single market, and also with finalising the ASEAN-China FTA.
Given Indonesia"s high trade share with other countries in East and Southeast Asia, it would seem to be in Indonesia"s long-term interest to push for progress on an East Asia-wide free trade area, and for progress on initiatives to secure greater monetary cooperation. After the 1997/98 crisis, many Indonesians together with Thais, Koreans and Malaysians realized that they could not depend on the Bretton Woods institutions to assist them in a major crisis. Countries less affected by the 1997/98 crisis including China and Vietnam drew the same conclusion. The events of 2008/9 will only strengthen the conviction that all the economies of East and South
East Asia have much to gain from closer cooperation, even if such cooperation also entails short-term costs to some producers in the region. But how should this cooperation proceed? The inauguration of the ACFTA has brought to light problems and grievances which are almost certainly going to vex relationships between the ASEAN countries and China for years and possibly decades to come. Given that the free trade area has come into being without any robust dispute resolution procedures, it is far from clear how disputes over dumping of products will be resolved.
The official enthusiasm in China for the ACFTA has raised suspicions in several parts of ASEAN, including Indonesia, that the Chinese will use it to their own advantage. On the import side, they will continue to press for access to Southeast Asia"s raw materials while continuing to impose barriers to imports from ASEAN of both agricultural and manufactured goods which might threaten their own producers. These suspicions are in turn based on fears about the motivations of Chinese foreign economic policy. Is China treating the major ASEAN governments in the same way that it has dealt with several regimes in Africa, whose governments have granted China access to oil, mineral resources, and even agricultural land, on favourable terms in exchange for loans and other forms of economic assistance? Certainly this has been the case in Myanmar, where Chinese economic support has been, and continues to be, essential for the survival of the regime. Indonesia, along with countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, are far from being client states of China, and economic relations should be conducted on the basis of mutual benefit, and respect for WTO procedures.
But at the same time, it is clear that China"s growing export power has forced several ASEAN countries to re-evaluate their longer-term comparative advantage. The ASEAN-4 (Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia) all made progress in increasing the share of manufactured exports in total exports over the decades from the 1970s to the 1990s, although exports of oil and gas and other mineral and agricultural products remained important in Indonesia, even after the reforms of the late 1980s led to rapid growth of exports of manufactures. Although it is true that Indonesia after the crisis of 1997/98 has not been as successful as Thailand in benefiting from the growth of trade in parts and components, it has continued to develop land-based export products such as palm oil, while at the same time taking advantage of growing world demand for both gas and other mineral products including coal. In addition, as this paper has argued, exports of garments, footwear and electrical products have increased in recent years, in spite of increased competition from China and other exporters including Pakistan.
But it is undeniable that fears of current Chinese intentions regarding the ACFTA have reinforced longstanding resentments on the part of indigenous Southeast Asians concerning the economic role of their own Chinese minorities. A pessimistic view of the future is that discontent on the part of both industrial and agricultural workers over "unfair" Chinese competition in Indonesia could spill over into violence against the Chinese minority, especially if trading companies owned by Indonesians of Chinese origin are seen to be benefiting from sales of merchandise originating from China. The greater political openness in the post-Soeharto era has encouraged some politicians to embrace economic nationalism in its more extreme form, with strong anti-Chinese undertones. It is quite possible that these elements will exploit resentments concerning the outcomes of the ACFTA. This in turn could lead to tensions within ASEAN, which could slow progress towards an ASEAN single market, which will remain the primary objective of ASEAN foreign economic policy over the next few years. A more optimistic view is that Indonesian producers of a range of primary and manufactured products will benefit from surging Chinese demand, while Indonesian producers and consumers will benefit from cheaper imports of capital equipment and consumer goods. Which view will prevail in coming years is difficult to predict. ASEAN-10 17.0 25.5 n.a n.a China n.a n.a 57.1 43.9 Japan n.a n.a 28.8 45.6 ASEAN plus 5 n.a n.a 41.1 52.7
Source: Chia (2007: 3) 
